R F Dearden; Theory and Practice in Education, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 14, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 17–29, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-.

R. F. Stalley; VIII*—Plato's Doctrine Of Freedom, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 98, Issue 1, 1 June 1998, Pages 145–158, https://doi.org/10.11.

Reading the Republic without reference to the less familiar Laws can lead to a distorted view of Plato's political theory. In the Republic the philosopher describes his ideal city; in his last and longest work he deals with the more detailed considerations involved in setting up a second-best 'practical utopia.' The relative neglect of the Laws has stemmed largely from the obscurity of its style and the apparent chaos of its organization so that, although good translations now exist, students of (...) philosophy and political science still find the text inaccessible. This first full-length philosophical introduction to the Laws will therefore prove invaluable. The opening chapters describe the general character of the dialogue and set it in the context of Plato's political philosophy as a whole. Each of the remaining chapters deals with a single topic, ranging over material scattered through the text and so drawing together the threads of the argument in a stimulating and readily comprehensible way. Those topics include education, punishment, responsibility, religion, virtue and pleasure as well as political matters and law itself. Throughout, the author encourages the reader to think critically about Plato's ideas and to see their relevance to present-day philosophical debate. No knowledge of Greek is required and only a limited background in philosophy. Although aimed primarily at students, the book will also be of interest to more advanced readers since it provides for the first time a philosophical, as opposed to linguistic or historical, commentary on the Laws in English. (shrink)

This book is the 1906 second edition of the Hulsean Lectures delivered at the University of Cambridge between 1901 and 1902. In these four lectures, F. R. Tennant challenges conventional teachings on Original Sin and the story of the Fall, arguing that his contemporaries had misinterpreted the biblical presentation of sin and its manifestations. Tennant aims to redefine the sin of both the race and the individual, and in doing so engages with traducianism and the philosophies of Malebranche, Kant and (...) Hegel. He argues that action predates modern conceptions of right and wrong, and that transgression is only sin if the actor is aware of what is morally right. Of course, these theories were met with great opposition, an opposition which Tennant uses the preface of this second edition to confront. These fascinating lectures and their appendages will be of great interest to scholars of Christian theology and the fin de siècle alike. (shrink)

Background: Patient autonomy has been promoted as the most important principle to guide difficult clinical decisions. To examine whether practising physicians indeed value patient autonomy above other considerations, physicians were asked to weight patient autonomy against three other criteria that often influence doctors’ decisions. Associations between physicians’ religious characteristics and their weighting of the criteria were also examined. Methods: Mailed survey in 2007 of a stratified random sample of 1000 US primary care physicians, selected from the American Medical Association masterfile. (...) Physicians were asked how much weight should be given to the following: (1) the patient’s expressed wishes and values, (2) the physician’s own judgment about what is in the patient’s best interest, (3) standards and recommendations from professional medical bodies and (4) moral guidelines from religious traditions. Results: Response rate 51% (446/879). Half of physicians (55%) gave the patient’s expressed wishes and values “the highest possible weight”. In comparative analysis, 40% gave patient wishes more weight than the other three factors, and 13% ranked patient wishes behind some other factor. Religious doctors tended to give less weight to the patient’s expressed wishes. For example, 47% of doctors with high intrinsic religious motivation gave patient wishes the “highest possible weight”, versus 67% of those with low (OR 0.5; 95% CI 0.3 to 0.8). Conclusions: Doctors believe patient wishes and values are important, but other considerations are often equally or more important. This suggests that patient autonomy does not guide physicians’ decisions as much as is often recommended in the ethics literature. (shrink)

The idea of freedom plays a key role in Plato's moral and political thought. In the Republic justice is shown to be beneficial because the just man alone is truly free. There are parallels here with modern discussions of freedom. The Laws argues that to be free a city must avoid the extremes of liberty and of authoritarianism. The legislator should rely on persuasion, not force, so that people willingly obey his laws. The underlying idea is that we are free (...) if we willingly follow the demands of reason rather than being coerced by external forces or by unruly desires. (shrink)

pt. 1. A critique of current educational aims.--pt. 2. Reason.--pt. 3. Education and reason.

R F Dearden; Play and Pleasure, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 5, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 37–41, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9752.1971.tb0044.

R F Dearden; Play and Pleasure, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 5, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 37–41, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9752.1971.tb0044.

R. F. Stalley; VIII*—Plato's Doctrine Of Freedom, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 98, Issue 1, 1 June 1998, Pages 145–158, https://doi.org/10.11.

The question of what counts as a successful outcome of the process of genetics counselling has recently become central because of the increasing calls for efficiency in health care, and for means of measuring efficiency. Angus Clarke has drawn attention to this trend, and has argued against both a measure in terms of the number of terminations of pregnancy performed as a result of counselling, and an assessment in terms of the contribution of genetics counselling to a national eugenics policy. (...) He suggests instead a measure of workload. There are good arguments for supporting Clarke's position up to a point. In looking for an appropriate measure, much turns on how genetics counselling is defined. It is here understood in the context of an autonomy model of health care. It is argued that there is a contradiction between such an interpretation and the termination measure of outcome. The political philosophy underlying this outcome is also defective. Workload is not sufficient as a measure of outcome however; it is essential to look at the proper goals of an activity. It is argued that these must be connected in some way with the genetic health of the population; that the promotion of reproductive autonomy itself is not sufficient as a goal. The concern for genetic health, however, is interpreted in a way that avoids Clarke's concerns about a national eugenics policy. (shrink)

Hume's is/ought distinction has long limited the role of empirical research in ethics, saying that data about what something is cannot yield conclusions about the way things ought to be. However, interest in empirical research in ethics has been growing despite this countervailing principle. We attribute some of this increased interest to a conceptual breakdown of the is/ought distinction. MacIntyre, in reviewing the history of the is/ought distinction, argues that is and ought are not strictly separate realms but exist in (...) a close relationship that is clarified by adopting a teleological orientation. We propose that, instead of recovering a teleological orientation, society tends to generate its own goals via democratic methods like those described by Rousseau or adopt agnosticism about teleology such as described by Richard Rorty. In both latter scenarios, the distinction between is and ought is obscured, and the role for empirical research grows, but for controversial reasons. MacIntyre warns that the is/ought distinction should remain, but reminds ethicists to make careful arguments about when and why it is legitimate to move from is to ought. (shrink)

In this article, we report findings from a qualitative study that explored how the relatives of intensive care unit patients experienced the nurses’ role and relationship with them in the end-of-life decision-making processes. In all, 27 relatives of 21 deceased patients were interviewed about their experiences in this challenging ethical issue. The findings reveal that despite bedside experiences of care, compassion and comfort, the nurses were perceived as vague and evasive in their communication, and the relatives missed a long-term perspective (...) in the dialogue. Few experienced that nurses participated in meetings with doctors and relatives. The ethical consequences imply increased loneliness and uncertainty, and the experience that the relatives themselves have the responsibility of obtaining information and understanding their role in the decision-making process. The relatives therefore felt that the nurses could have been more involved in the process. (shrink)

R F Dearden; Theory and Practice in Education, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 14, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 17–29, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-.

It hardly needs to be said that the parallel between mental and physical health plays an important part in Plato's moral philosophy. One of the central claims of the Republicis that justice is to the soul what health is to the body .1 Similar points are made in other dialogues.2 This analogy between health and sickness on the one hand and virtue and vice on the other is closely connected to the so–called Socratic paradoxes. Throughout his life Plato seems to (...) have clung in some sense to the ideas that justice is our greatest good, that the unjust man is correspondingly miserable and that no one is therefore willingly unjust. It follows from these ideas that the unjust man, like the sick man, is in a wretched state which is not of his own choosing. (shrink)

The "problem of counterfactuals," as proposed by Goodman and Chisholm, cannot be solved. However, a similar program, pioneered by Hiż and Mrs. Milmed, but largely neglected, can be completed and promises a satisfactory analysis of subjunctive conditionals.

R F Dearden; Happiness and Education, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 2, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 17–29, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9752.1968.

In Chapter 4 of his essay Utilitarianism, “Of what sort of Proof the Principle of Utility is susceptible,” J. S. Mill undertakes to prove, in some sense of that term, the principle of utility. It has very commonly been argued that in the course of this “proof” Mill commits two very obvious fallacies. The first is the naturalistic fallacy which he is held to commit when he argues that since “the only proof capable of being given that an object is (...) visible, is that people actually see it. The only proof that a sound is audible is that people hear it: and so of the other sources of our experience. In like manner … the sole evidence it is possible to produce that anything is desirable, is that people do actually desire it.”1 Here Mill appears to hold that “X is desirable ”—a value judgment—follows deductively from “People desire x”—a factual statement. And the second is the fallacy of composition which seems to be involved in Mill'zs argument that since “each person's happiness is a good to that person … the general happiness, therefore, a good to the aggregate of all persons.”2. (shrink)

Hume regards the will as an impression which normally is followed by an appropriate bodily movement. It is unclear why he adopts this theory instead of saying that passions are directly followed by actions (a view which would in some respects suit him better). I suggest that he needs impressions of the will to explain our knowledge of our own acts. They thus play an indispensible role in hume's newtonian science of the mind.